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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0"). 
DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case deals with the sale of a home from John and Darby Bradley ("Bradleys") to 
Douglas and Andrea Markham ("Markhams") at a time the housing market saw home prices 
rapidly rising. The home was located in an area north of St. George called Dammeron 
Valley. It consisted of a home on eight acres with a pond and horse corrals. The property 
was actually a combination of three separate lots that had previously been subdivided on 
paper, but were then being used as one lot. The Bradleys were in the middle of a contested 
divorce at the time, and Mrs. Bradley was living out of state. 
After the Bradleys and the Markhams had signed the written contract and the earnest 
money had been paid, the Bradleys, without saying anything to the Markhams, decided they 
no longer wanted to sell their home. The day before the deadline for the Markhams to 
produce certain financial information, the Bradleys told the Markhams that they did not want 
the financial documents for a couple of weeks and would follow up with them when they 
needed that information. The Bradleys then tried to kill the deal eight days later on the 
pretext that the Markhams had not turned in their financial information by the deadline. 
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The Markhams wanted to purchase the home and, therefore, when the Bradleys tried 
to claim the deal was off, the Markhams refused to accept this. They submitted their 
financial information to the Bradleys and stated they were prepared to move forward at the 
scheduled closing date. The Bradleys then sent another notice that the deal was off, this time 
on the pretext that the financial information was inadequate, citing to the quality of the fax 
transmission and the general appearance of the financial information as their key reasons. 
The Markhams again informed the Bradleys that they were ready to proceed to closing, 
would pay off the seller financing immediately (early) by having other financing made 
available at closing, and again insisted that the Bradleys close as scheduled. The Bradleys 
refused to close, and the Markhams filed their suit for specific performance to require the 
Bradleys to go through with the sale. 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION AT TRIAL 
The Markhams, concurrent with filing their Complaint for Specific Performance on 
October 21, 2004, also sought a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to 
prevent the Bradleys from trying to sell or further encumber the home or doing any harm to 
the home and property while the matter was pending. A Stipulated Injunctive Order was 
ultimately entered by the trial court and continued in full force and effect through the time 
of trial. The case proceeded to trial on January 24 and 25, 2006. The trial court took 
evidence regarding the issues presented in the Stipulated Pretrial Order, including evidence 
regarding the Bradleys' violation of the Stipulated Injunctive Order. At the conclusion of 
trial, the trial court asked counsel for both the Bradleys and the Markhams to submit 
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proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The trial court entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law on March 14, 2006, granting the specific performance relief 
the Markhams sought and attorneys' fees, and finding the Bradleys in contempt of court for 
violating the injunction. 
On April 17, 2006, the trial court entered its Final Judgment and Order, and the 
Bradleys quickly filed an ex parte motion for a stay on the Final Judgment and Order and for 
extra time to file post-judgment motions, which the trial court rejected. On May 1,2006, the 
Bradleys filed with the trial court a Motion to Stay, a Motion for Expedited Disposition 
regarding the Motion to Stay, a Motion to Amend the Findings or Make Additional Findings, 
and a Motion for New Trial. 
In addition to filing those with the trial court, on May 18, 2006, the Bradleys filed 
with the Court of Appeals an "Ex Parte and Expedited Motion to Stay Proceedings to Enforce 
Judgment as Asserted Under Utah R. App. P. Rules 8 and 23" and an "Ex Parte Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief." (CA 20060455 docket). Both Motions were denied on May 30,2006. 
In the meantime, the date for closing under the trial court's order arrived, and the 
Bradleys came in on the closing date (May 18, 2006) in the evening and signed all of the 
necessary documents to complete the closing. The trial court ultimately denied the Bradleys5 
post-trial motions as well and ultimately granted the Markhams their attorneys5 fees on the 
post-trial motions, including the motion to the Court of Appeals. 
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III. STATEMENTS OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED 
The trial court entered detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, a complete 
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A. The facts most relevant to this appeal are 
set forth below. 
1. The Markhams were looking at homes in Washington County at a time when 
the housing market was seeing big increases in prices and activity. (R. 881, TT 112:1-14). 
2. While working with their real estate agent, Carolyn Norton ("Ms. Norton"), the 
Markhams were attracted to the Bradleys' property because of its unique characteristics, 
including a pond and horse corrals, all on 8.25 acres which was subdivided as to allow two 
additional homes to be built. (R.881, TT 18:21-19:17; 20:4-8; R. 270 H 9). 
3. Mr. Markham called Mr. Bradley to discuss some of the financial terms 
regarding the Markhams' purchase of the property, at which time Mr. Bradley requested that 
the Bradleys receive approximately one-half of the purchase price at closing and that they 
were willing to finance the balance, although nothing was said about any terms or special 
reasons for seller financing. (R. 881, TT 21:1-16; R.271 If 12). 
4. The Markhams did not need or prefer the seller financing idea, but were willing 
to accommodate the request if it was on reasonable terms, and only if they were able to pay 
off the balance early without penalty, which Ms. Norton told them was the standard language 
of the agreement and that she would not write it up any other way. (R. 271 f^ 15). 
5. When Ms. Norton presented the formal written offer to the Bradleys, she stated 
to Mr. Bradley that the Markhams did not have the seller financing addendum with the 
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formal written offer at that time, to which Mr. Bradley stated that, because Mr. Markham is 
a doctor and Mrs. Markham is a dentist, and that he was getting one-half of the purchase 
price as a down payment, he was not worried about the financial information. (R. 272-73 
1120). 
6. Ms. Norton was dealing directly with Mr. Bradley, as Mrs. Bradley was in 
Bellingham, Washington, at the time and was seeking a divorce from Mr. Bradley; however, 
Mr. Bradley was able to obtain Mrs. Bradley's signature on the final approved real estate 
contract. (R. 272 ^ 17-18). 
7. The parties stipulated, and through trial testimony it was established, that 
Mr. Bradley had authority to act on behalf of both himself and Mrs. Bradley and was 
designated to receive all communications and documents regarding the sale of the property, 
and that Mrs. Bradley had not designated any other real estate agent or her broker to act on 
her behalf or receive or review documents while she was out of town. (R. 233 ^ 4; R. 283 
HA). 
8. Ms. Norton delivered a fully signed copy of the contract to Mr. Bradley and, 
at that time, scheduled a meeting for September 12 between the Markhams and the Bradleys 
for the purpose of going over the financial information and other contingency items listed in 
the contract. (R. 274 ffi[ 25-27). 
9. The Markhams came to the property for the scheduled meeting on September 
12, and when they arrived, they were approached by a very angry Mr. Bradley, who was 
yelling at them "what the hell are you doing here?" (R. 276 j^ 31). 
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10. Mr. Bradley finally settled down enough to allow the Markhams to walk 
through the property and the home and, at the end of this quick walk-through, Mr. Markham 
pulled out his financial information to deliver it to Mr. Bradley and confirm whether there 
was any additional financial information that would be needed or in what format Mr. Bradley 
wanted the financial information. (R. 277-278 fflf 36-40). 
11. Mr. Bradley, refusing to accept the financial information, said he would deal 
with it in a couple of weeks. (R. 278 f^ 39). 
12. At the time Mr. Bradley refused the Markhams' tender of financial documents, 
he did not examine them and did not know whether they contained a credit report or not. 
(R. 881, TT 266:2-7). 
13. The Markhams returned to their home, and Ms. Norton began trying to set a 
new meeting date with the Bradleys, but her calls went unanswered and she was unable to 
find Mr. Bradley at his various work sites. (R. 278 TJ 41). 
14. The next contact that the Markhams had from the Bradleys was Ms. Norton's 
receipt on September 20 of a fax claiming the Bradleys were canceling the contract because 
the Markhams had not given them the financial information by September 13. (R. 278 j^ 42). 
15. Ms. Norton immediately called Mrs. Bradley and explained to her that when 
Mr. Markham tried to give Mr. Bradley the financial information, Mr. Bradley refused to take 
it and said he did not want it for a couple of weeks, to which Mrs. Bradley replied that she 
"never wanted to sell the property anyway" and that she was "not going to sell the property 
now" - the Markhams had missed the deadline and that was that. (R. 279 j^ 45). 
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16. The Markhams refused to consider thai the deal was canceled ai id tc -ok tl lis as 
am indication thai flu. \ m i d o l lu \\ n\ \h III in i uneii l lm m ml i i i fu in ia l iouand to obtain a 
c - d r ivnon i r 280 ffl[ 48-49). 
1 ; • Markhams felt very rushed in trying to get this information together 
immediately <i iiK. ..r- ••• ^ •: 
s ><< • Jiiaiiuii iiuiii uicii most recent bank statements, uhuii 
required them to use whiteout to remove the old information from the form and put in new 
information. (R. 280^49). 
jg Q , h • • iKi , financial information to 
make it as current as possible, they begaii liying to fax it to Ms. Norton from their home ":\ 
machine. However, because of the size of the fax and other tech,u*.a; problems, they had 
t r o u b l e g e t t i n g t he l ax i r a i i s i i i i . sMon In \ n i l n n u i ' h p i u p i mlv • I• I*I h.nl m K f . i \ m. in> n l i lu1 
p a g e s (R \ X I ) 1 | M l ) ; •-.'. - '" -:.-•• . ; ' : - .- -. ; •• - '. ; - .-. ' 
19. Ms, Norton assembled as best as possible all of the information and the credit 
report the Markhams 1 lad faxed, at id faxed it to tl le t si aciieys JI i Septei i ibei 24 v ' itl I i t. :: : > =:;i 
l u i i i i l ' ' " s n n i s u s i ) '; • ' .-. ;.'• .'• .' ':' ;•'..' • .,. '•. ' • . - • _ • 
20. In the meantime, the Markhams had been working with Countrywide Home 
I ,oans ("Countrywide") to obtain financing tor tliur propert". ... • alifoi i na, so they askcd 
"n i HI 11 in i [;,, v\ ide (u Imaiice Ihri MIIM pun lm ivofthc Mudle^ linmr and,, I »v September 30, (hey 
had received formal notification from Countrywide that they were approved for the loan (R 
280-281 If 53). 
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21. The credit report they sent to the Bradleys showed a credit score of 689 for Mr. 
Markham and 705 for Mrs. Markham, which are not poor scores, and only four instances of 
late payments - two times in 2003 and two times in 2001 - all of which were only 30 days 
later. There was no reference of a judgment or bankruptcy on the credit report. (R. 281 Tffi 
56-57). 
22. On October 4, after receiving notification of the Markham's Countrywide loan 
approval, the Bradleys had their attorney, Robert Jensen, send a letter to the Markhams 
stating they were canceling the contract because they had not received financial information 
by September 13, and that the financial information they had received was rejected because 
it was difficult to read, poor fax quality, the pages seemed out of order, and they had found 
a reference to either a bankruptcy or a judgment. (R. 281 U 55). 
23. However, the bankruptcy was one Mr. Markham had filed approximately 12 
years earlier due to a doctor group with which he had been involved and circumstances 
stemming from that business relationship over which he had no control. (R. 881, TT 50:9-15, 
19-22; R-289 | M(vi); R. 281 U 56). 
24. By this time, the Bradleys were beyond actually evaluating the documents to 
determine whether they should complete the transaction. Rather, their evaluation was a 
pretext to cancel, as they were just trying to kill the deal. (R. 881, TT 54:12-13; R. 290 TfN). 
25. Not only had Mrs. Bradley never wanted to sell the property and did not want 
to sell it now, and the Bradleys had tried to cancel the contract on the pretext of a missed 
deadline and a poor-quality fax transaction of financial documents, but unbeknownst to the 
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Markhams at the time, the Bradleys 1 lad, 01 i Septeinbei 9, el iai iged tl le i eal estate listii lg to 
\ . i l , •• .: ' ' nerkhn: sales 
contract, further indicating the intent of the Bradleys to get oui oi Hie . eji dial lie}- were 
contractually obligated to fulfill. (R. 282 T( 59). 
" SU.I\ I M A I U \n- \t\x.\ ,Vn^ i 
1 .-. two lii ichpin issues. 'Ihe first issue is whether the Bradleys waived or 
otherwise lost their right to strictly enforce the September 13 deadline for the Markhams to 
provide ther" financial ^ . ... ><>,,u:i^ i;se .\A \ 
• - •* s wiiethci the Bradleys exercised good 
faith and fair dealing in evaluating the Markhams' credit worthiness as shown in the financial 
information the Bradleys later received. 
' • • • . . ] . ' r . -
as well as the testimony of the Bradleys. i.a ui^ ie^aid, ;i ib significant that the tin; c MI 
ultimately concluded that the testimony of Mr. Bradley on the critical facts was not credible, 
but was unreliable. I lie ttial conn spenliu. ally i nim ludi r! ilium Mr llmdln nthei I'IHC fnlse 
testii II loi i/y at ti iai to fit a legal theory oi tl lat he withheld information and truthful responses 
during the deposition, but, in either event, the trial court did not consider Mr. Bradley's most 
critical testi.rn.ony, particularly about his own actions, to be ci edit le 1 1 le ti: iai : : i in 11 i : t : i 
ti ii: ,.t f in Bt adle^ 's dei i leai ic i at tit iai • ii :1 i i : t eon ive) r credibility. ' Fhe trial, court also 
concluded that Mrs. Bradley's testimony lacked eivJihiii;\ as \u-n Ou Jie other hand, the 
trial court concluded that the testimonies of Mr. Markham. and 1 lis witness, Ms. Norton, were 
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credible and that the affidavits of Mr. Markham and Ms. Norton, admitted into evidence, 
were reliable. 
As to the first linchpin issue, the facts at trial established that on September 12, the 
Markhams had scheduled a meeting with the Bradleys with one of the specific purposes 
being the delivery of financial information to the Bradleys and to discuss what format they 
would prefer for receiving further financial information. The Bradleys were to be 
represented by Mr. Bradley at this meeting, and he was aware of the deadline and the purpose 
of the meeting. At this September 12 meeting, Mr. Bradley specifically refused to accept any 
financial information, preferring to wait for at least a couple of weeks when Mrs. Bradley 
could review it. 
The trial court properly concluded that the Bradleys had a known right, knew the 
benefits of that right, and waived the right to have the documents delivered to them on 
September 13 when they had rejected them on September 12. The trial court was correct in 
concluding that the contract could not be terminated based on the Bradleys not receiving the 
financial documents by September 13, because, by their own actions, they had waived the 
deadline. This waiver implicitly included a waiver of any requirement that the extension of 
the deadline be in writing. 
The second linchpin issue is whether the Bradleys, in good faith, evaluated the 
Markhams' financial information once they received it. The evidence at trial established that 
the Bradleys did not evaluate the credit worthiness of the Markhams in reviewing the 
financial information. Rather than considering the information showing the Markhams' 
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financial stability, income, deposit accounts, and. tnslors * illi oilin \ tnliluis, (lie Riixlli ,', 
foci: - • • i he trial court concluded that the 
Bradleys had testified that the most important elements in their decision to reject the financial 
information was that it was handwritten and looked sloppy and i.ic\ nau „ , uwjec;.** . 
actual infoiniatiuii mi Ilk iqiuif iqvtdfiii^ llii M.nl» li.inr,,1 iiii illi'l'., inn oiin , tlieir net wor th, 
en (lieii L in hi scores. Therefore, it was objectively unreasonable for the Bradleys to reject 
the Markhams' financial information on such a basis. 
Finnnv r™ pi lrposes of the appea. .w tv nilliei i .sues JS, II i mieerniiig:' 
( • ufln s inil1, prcscn/etl the issues they are now presenting to this Court; 
(uj wnviiiu ihey have identified the appropriate standard of review for any preserved issues; 
(c) whether they have properly marshaled the ev idetKe m those instances w ;u- ;. a r 
andni l i i> hc l l iu 11 n MiiiiUitiiii*. J H H I U lie i\\ ihlrr l Iheii I I I I H U H S 1 t i n 1 incurred on <:rr al. 
ARGUMENT 
I.- '-•'. THE TRIM COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT LEGAL SI AI ' Il ' III' 
-;••-; ' IN EVALUATING THE BRADLEYS' COMPLIANCE Wi l l i Il1 
• '. COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND F AIR DEALING 
Tl iei e are two reasons why the trial court did not ei i in its rulings in\ olving the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing (the "Covenant"). First, the Bradleys never presented 
Iheir notion ol a subjective standaid kn e\ aliuilmy, compliant t NIMI llii < 'ON HI,ml ilhe 
••• s - ;i>iuL uiaii law makes clear that compliance with 
the Covenant is measured by an objective standard, m- i-*e Subjective Standard that the 
Bradleys propose for the first time in their opening brief 
797244v4 1 1 
A. The Bradleys Failed to Preserve Their Argument That Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing is Properly Measured by a Subjective Standard. 
In their Statement of the Issues, the Bradleys claim to have preserved their arguments 
about the Subjective Standard at R. 399 and TT 405:12 through 408-14. A review of these 
two locations in the Record makes clear that the Bradleys did not preserve their argument 
about a Subjective Standard. 
Page 399 of the Record is a page from a memorandum supporting the Bradley's post-
trial motion captioned as being brought pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59. 
However, Utah law makes clear that "raising an issue in a post-trial motion does not preserve 
that issue for appeal." Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm 'n, 945 P.2d 125,130 n.l (Utah App. 
1997) (citation omitted), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). Thus, the Bradleys did not 
preserve this argument at page 399. 
Pages 405 through 408 of the trial transcript do not even contain the word 
"subjective," much less explain why the trial court should have evaluated the Bradleys' 
actions by a Subjective Standard. An appellant preserves a substantive issue such as the 
Subjective Standard for appeal only if at trial the appellant (i) timely raised the issue before 
the trial court: (ii) specifically raised the issue in a way that the issue rises to a "level of 
consciousness before the trial court"; and (iii) introduced to the trial court "supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority" to support the argument. See id. at 130 (citations 
omitted). The "mere mention of an issue in the pleadings is insufficient to raise an issue at 
trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal." Id. (citation omitted). 
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The Bradleys fail eacl i of these three requirements. I he IVhnkliiiiiiN s p e u l n alh vd 
forth in iin mi in in in in i iilii I in MI I iiiy ' 'i |i iiih imi'il exercise the discretion given him in a 
contract in an objectively reasonable manner, " (R. 243). In closing argument, when, asked 
about the extent of discretion allowed, to the Bradleys, the Bradleys ' attorney stated he agreed 
with the Markhiiiiis' afloine\ . /nainil II1 M l III IOd Ml I i n I lie | mpiiM f 
tl icse i eqi lirci nents is to "put UIL J • % on notice of inc asserted error and allow the 
opportunity for vorrection at that lime in the course of the proceeding." Badger v. Brooklyn 
Canal Co.. % r ._ii .*-t-r. ^ ,» M;-, , ,v... ;^'uiuM :iu: 
tlic ;. ' - - • •*ardin • \\u --jnicctive Standard, this Court 
should affirm the trial court's application of an objective standard. 
B. Even If This Court Reaches the Bradley's Subjective Standard 
Argument Utah Law Makes Clear That Compliance With the 
Covenant is Evaluated by an Objective Standard 
The Bradleys rely heavily on Oak wood Village, LLC v. Albertson 's, Inc., 2*)1 M T 
101, 104 P.3d 1,226, to make their argument that they could subjectively comply w A • ^ 
Covenant. Allliotijiji (Ins is ilic nuisi i n i iin I h.ili Mipn inn i unit i l tu \ iu i i In I/XJ 
Covei lai it, , tl i ,a„t < ic: cisic m i did not involve a situation analogous to this dispute. In Oakwood 
Village, landlord/appellant urged the Supreme Court to hold that the Covenant implied a duty 
of continuous operate ....:. .^ jui i^d ;u.ant. appellee to i ei i ia.ii i opei i tl n on igl i„oi it tl i,e ei itii: e 
te i i it i, of tl ic gt c •! n id le as> : • bet1 > " :> :M i tl lei i i (tl le "I 'ease") . & *.e h I, at f^ 16. The Si inn-me Cuart 
declined to make that holding because the "plain and. uni nistakable language" of the Lease 
prevented it "from, inferring a covenant of continuous operations. See id yi\ :w. -eiinci ihe 
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Bradleys nor the Markhams asked the trial court to use the Covenant to infer anything, and 
the trial court did not do so. 
Furthermore, the Oakwood Village opinion did not perform a detailed examination of 
the Covenant, and it announced no new legal principle. Its analysis of the Covenant occupies 
only two of the opinion's sixteen pages in the Pacific Reporter. Much of those two pages 
consist of a recitation of the facts in two earlier decisions, St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. 
St Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) and Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. v. 
Smith fs Food & Drug Ctrs., 889 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 
(Utah 1995), which the Oakwood Village court recognized were "the controlling cases on the 
requirements and operation" of the Covenant. Oakwood Village, 2004 UT 101 at 1J 47. 
In St. Benedict's, express lease language required landlord/hospital to "actively assist" 
its existing tenant "in acquiring and holding good tenants until such time as [the existing 
tenant's] Office Building is completely occupied." Id. at [^ 48. The St. Benedict's court 
simply held that the hospital's encouragement of a new developer could violate the Covenant 
arising from the express contract term. See id. As with Oakwood Village, the St. Benedict's 
opinion is not analytically useful in this appeal because neither party asked the trial court to 
imply provisions, and the trial court did not do so. 
Rather, the Bradleys are asking this Court to hold that compliance with the Covenant 
is measured by a subjective, rather than an objective, standard. Olympus Hills, the other 
decision cited by the Oakwood Village decision as controlling, see id. at j^ 47, expressly holds 
that an objective standard applies. 
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'I l ie (Jakwooii ) i/iagc opinion summari/cd (lie re in .nil i ' /n///w lhl(\ f'n m 
•upus Hills involved a lease between a developer ami a smii;. -
cry store, which contained an express covenant of continuous 
operation that obliged Smith's to continuously operate "any lawful 
retail selling business." Rather than defaulting on the lease, Smith's 
opened a warehouse box store in order to restrict competition \\ **" 
grocer\ store it operate*! elo^i ^ \u i )U n*pi-s Hi 'K* Sl^p* 
Id. at ^ fi() (citations omitted). Accordingly, the critical phrase in Olympus Hills was "any 
law fill retail selnne business " Smith's argued that "any" meant "any," and that, so long as 
Si i litl i's operate. - ;.,/..;.; :....: . *• --s 
In rejecting Smith's argument, this Court held that "any" does not unqualifiedly mean 
"any," and that the Covenant prevents contractual words :iom oemg read mera. 
lite i al readii lg w 01 i l < : ••'. - • • ; • ; -.-' . 
[Contracting parties, iiaiu as the) may lr\. cannm • educe e\cn 
understanding to a stated term. Instances inevitably arise in which * IK 
party exercises discretion retained ir. a way that denies the other a 
reasonably expected benefit of the bargain, for example, if taken to its 
logical extreme, the express provision of the lease in the instant case 
would allow Smith's to set up a cardboard box in the leased space and 
sell cigars, an action that would clearly deny Olympus Hills the 
.-•'"' expected benefit of its bargain. The law of good faith and fair dealing, 
though inexact, attempts a remedy for such abuse. 
Olympus Hills, KK9 I'.AJ at -IM) (uiLition^ onulUd) 
Nrilhei f Kdwtunl IV/A/ir \u\vSf lieiwdict's addressed the question of the restrictions 
tl lat the Covenant places on a contracting party's exercise of discretion On the other hand, 
Olympus Hills is the seminal I Jtah appellate decision regarding the limits that the Covenant 
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places on a contracting party's exercise of contractual discretion. In this regard, the Olympus 
Hills court wrote: 
[I]n this case, our inquiry does not end with the recognition that Smith's 
had the discretionary power or contractual authority to operate "any 
lawful retail selling business." The question is whether . . . Smith's 
wrongfully exercised this power for a reason beyond the risks that 
Olympus Hills assumed in its lease with Smith's or for a reason 
inconsistent with Olympus Hills's "justified expectations." 
The trial court correctly determined that Olympus Hills justifiably 
expected that Smith's would select a reasonable economic use for the 
property in good faith. 
Id. at 451 (emphasis in original); see also, Cook v. Zions First Natl Bank, 919 P.2d 56, 60 
(Utah App. 1996), cert denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996) ("When one party to a contract 
retains power or sole discretion in an express contract, it must exercise that discretion 
reasonably and in good faith"); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 311 
(Utah 1982) (stating that a party breaches the Covenant if it fails to exercise all of its rights 
under the contract reasonably). 
This Court continued in Olympus Hills to explain that "the essence of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing is objectively reasonable conduct. " Id. (emphasis added); see 
also, Weinstein v. Popiel, 2003 UT App 385, 2003 WL 22682737 at * 1 . ! 
1
 This Court's application of an objective standard for compliance with the Covenant 
is unqualified. In two decisions with more limited application, the Utah Supreme Court has 
confirmed that compliance with the Covenant is measured by an objective standard. In 
Berube v. Fashion Ctr. Ltd, 111 P.2d 1033,1048 (Utah 1989) the Utah Supreme Court held 
that compliance with the Covenant is measured by reference to the "objectively reasonable 
expectations" of the party who claims that the Covenant was breached. More recently, in 
Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461,465 (Utah 1996), the Supreme Court held 
that under an insurance contract "the overriding requirement imposed by the implied 
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T h u s , t h e que<uuu, , * is 
o1 • " •;!::-• . . •• * I U U I I J tl lat, as an objective matter, the Bradleys 
acted unreasonably (R. 288-290 f^ M) and that their actions violated the Covenant. (R 290 
Tf N). These are factual questions. See Olympus hm^ . . ..->\ .,. • 
resokcti ilui issur .IJMMISI IIH Bi.idli \ • I In \ hn\ c tin >l iihiislhilrd Ihr v\ idcncc supporting 
^ j i e | : naj c o u r t ' s finding and are thus precluded from attacking the finding on appeal In sin "*i, 
the Bradleys have identified no basis for reversing the trial coin i - i ,hwing that the iii .VA^. *, 
actions violated tl le requirements« •• * . ! 
1 r i ab it relates to a different issue on appeal, they presented 
no e\ idcncc at ti ml, nor do thev argue no^ ilial they acted in an objectively reasonable way. 
Therefore, the Hn1 -^urt sn*it,Ks «'.; attirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL c U L K i fROPERLY DENIED THE BRADLEYS' 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT. 
At trial and in tl leir appellate brief, the Bradleys have mistakenly referred to their 
motion made at tl ic close of tl >e Markhams' . ,r^ ..« ." 
I . . Mnce the motion was made immediately after the 
Markhams concluded their evidence and before the Bradleys ;*ui «>! ihur e\ idcncc in 
defense, the motion was actually a motion ^ J^n,;^. under Ri„v 
( M-- iiowever, 
is only a minoi iormul"* a& Uns Court should ijok past _iic motioi i's label to its substance 
covenant is thai insurers aci Kasona: < . inndi HI I|IMIIII;> <, ilh ilium M 
i n s u r e d s . " ( e m r h i s r - adH<vK 
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and treat it accordingly. Id. at \ 6. The Markhams will refer to this motion by its true 
substantive character and call it the "Motion to Dismiss." 
The Bradleys misunderstand both the role of the trial court and the standard of review 
for this Court as it relates to their Motion to Dismiss. The issue before the trial court was 
whether the evidence put on by the Markhams was sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 
Id. at TJ 8. See also, Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Cooper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 
App. 1994). This is a question of law for this Court to review for correctness. Grossen, 
1999 UT App 167 at ^ } 8. The first step is to identify the issue the Bradleys presented in their 
Motion to Dismiss, for this is the only issue that is preserved for an appeal of the denial of 
their Motion to Dismiss. However, the Bradleys do not identify the substance of their 
Motion to Dismiss, nor do they analyze the evidence that was available to the trial court at 
the time they made their Motion to Dismiss. 
A. The Markhams Established at Least a Prima Facie Case Through 
Their Testimony and Evidence. 
The Markhams, as set forth above, only needed to show a prima facie case to 
overcome the Motion to Dismiss. The Bradleys argued before the trial court that the 
Markhams failed to make a prima facie case based on the following points: (a) there was a 
written contract with a "time is of the essence" clause (R. 881, TT 250:16-20); (b) the 
Markhams were required to submit a credit report by a September 13 deadline (R. 881, TT 
250:24-25); (c) the Markhams failed to tender the credit report by the required deadline (R. 
881, TT 251:1-7); and (d) assuming all the evidence presented by the Markhams to be true, 
they cannot prevail because they did not have the credit report with them at the meeting on 
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September 12 (R.881, TT 254:20-23). That is the sum total of the argument preserved for 
appeal from their Motion to Dismiss, all of which address only the waiver issue, which the 
Markhams discuss later in this brief. 
The Bradleys challenge the trial court's denial of their Motion to Dismiss by 
attempting to marshal evidence. However, they do not try to marshal evidence discussed by 
the trial court in entering its ruling. Rather, the Bradleys try to marshal evidence unrelated 
to the waiver issue they argued in their Motion to Dismiss. 
The trial court evaluated the Markhams' testimony regarding the Bradleys' waiver of 
strict compliance with the September 13 deadline and, after hearing legal argument, denied 
the Motion to Dismiss, concluding that the Markhams had met their burden of establishing 
a prima facie case. (R. 881, TT 267:1-4, 16-20, 23-25). In so doing, the trial court 
concluded that it "is to accept all evidence as stated and all reasonable inferences on the 
evidence that might be drawn" (R. 881, TT 265: 18-20), and then listed several key points 
of evidence on which it based its ruling: 
a. At the September 12 meeting, Mr. Bradley refused to look at the financial 
information and, at that point, did not know whether there was a credit report 
included or not (R. 881, TT 266:2-6); 
b. Mr. Bradley did not take the opportunity to look at or accept the financial 
information; rather, he refused the offer (R. 881, TT 266:6-7); 
c. The meeting was specifically scheduled on September 12 for the purpose of 
delivering the financial information to the Bradleys (R. 881, TT 266:12-13); 
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d. Mr. Bradley "foiled" the purpose of the meeting by refusing the financial 
information (R. 881, TT 266:14-15); 
e. 11 is reasonable to infer that any further efforts to give the financial information 
to Mr. Bradley on either September 12 or September 13 would have been idle 
efforts, because Mr. Bradley had said not to talk to him about it for a couple 
of weeks (R. 881, TT 266:21-25); 
f. The Markhams made a tender of the financial information, and full 
information could have been given by the September 13 deadline, but they 
were put off by Mr. Bradley's actions at the September 12 meeting (R. 881, TT 
267:1-4); 
g. "There was hardly a point in sending [Mr. Bradley] a credit report when he 
wouldn't even look at what was offered to him before the day that was the 
deadline" (R. 881, TT 267:9-11). 
As set forth in Grossen v. Dewitt, on appeal the Bradleys must show that the trial 
evidence, and reasonable inferences, do not support the ruling by the trial court, and that it 
was an error of law for the trial court to deny their Motion to Dismiss. The Bradleys have 
not done this. They have not evaluated the trial court's ruling from the bench, nor have they 
marshaled the evidence that had been presented up to that time in the trial. In fact, their 
marshaled evidence does not address the issue of whether a credit report was presented on 
time or that the Markhams' waiver argument was upheld by the trial court. Rather, the 
Bradleys attempt to marshal, and argue, that they subjectively acted in good faith in trying 
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to cancel the contract based on their subjective review of the financial information they later 
received. The Bradleys' argument is irrelevant to the issue they preserved and which they 
set forth as their second issue on appeal. 
B. The Issues Raised in the Bradleys9 Motion for New Trial are Not 
the Issues Raised on Appeal 
As with the Motion to Dismiss, the actual Motion for New Trial (hereafter "New Trial 
Motion") presented to the trial court is what must be evaluated on appeal. The Bradleys do 
not analyze their New Trial Motion in their brief, nor do they evaluate the trial court's ruling 
on the New Trial Motion. Rather, they simply attack one legal conclusion, para. M, 
regarding the Covenant. However, they do not challenge this conclusion as not being 
supported by the findings of fact. 
On appeal, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard to a trial judge's decision 
to deny a new trial. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, % 25, 82 P.3d 1064, 1070. 
The Record is examined to determine whether the evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings "was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the [ruling] 
plainly unreasonable and unjust." McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977). 
Under this standard of review, the reviewing court should reverse only if there is no 
reasonable basis for the decision. Smith, 2003 UT 41 at ^ 25. 
In their brief, the Bradleys do not show that the evidence was completely lacking. The 
Bradleys claim there were "six fact sets" the "trial court relied upon" in determining the 
Bradleys breached the Covenant that are not supported by the evidence. (Br. of Appellant 
31, If 1). However, the Bradleys did not raise these "six fact sets" in their New Trial Motion. 
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(R. 398-401). In their New Trial Motion, they simply argued that they had the right to be 
dissatisfied with the financial information regardless of the reason. Because their arguments 
and marshaling do not address their New Trial Motion, it is difficult to determine just what 
is to be opposed and argued by the Markhams. Such an inadequate briefing shifts the burden 
and need not be analyzed by this Court. State v. Sloan, 2003 UTApp 170, If 13, 72 P.3d 138. 
First, the fact sets to which the Bradleys refer are contained in the trial court's 
"Conclusions of Law," and are therefore a recap of various unchallenged findings of fact and 
showing how, as a matter of law, the Bradleys did not act reasonably. Second, since the 
Bradleys have not challenged the sufficiency of the findings of fact to support the 
conclusions of law, the findings are accepted by this Court, and the Bradleys had the duty to 
identify each of the specific findings of fact that support this conclusion by the trial court. 
Third, once the specific findings of fact were identified, the Bradleys had a duty to search out 
any fatal flaw in the trial court's findings by citing to every scrap of evidence in the Record, 
whether testimony or exhibit, that supports the trial court's conclusion and not omit certain 
evidence to paint a more favorable picture for their argument. Fourth, the Bradleys were 
required to then demonstrate that the findings cannot be supported by the evidence and 
reasonable inferences therefrom, which they did not do. 
C. The Bradleys9 Marshaling of Evidence Throughout Their Brief is 
Inadequate. 
"In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger 
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." West Valley City 
797244v4 22 
v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). After presenting every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial, the appellant then "must ferret out a fatal flaw in 
the evidence." Id. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court 
that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. Id. If the appellants fail to properly 
marshal evidence, the appellate court has grounds to either affirm the trial court's findings 
on that basis alone or assume that the findings are supported by the clear weight of evidence. 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 80,100 P.3d 1177 (holding that failure to marshal allows the 
appellate court to affirm the trial court's findings); State v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 
946-47 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that failure to marshal allows the appellate court to 
assume findings are supported by clear weight of evidence). This analysis applies equally 
to the Bradleys' attempt to marshal in their later arguments, as discussed infra. 
A challenge to a trial court's factual findings usually requires the appellant to marshal 
only evidence for contested findings. Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^ 76, 100 P.3d 1177. When 
appealing a trial court's denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for a new trial, the 
appellant is obligated to first marshal the evidence in support of the ruling and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
ruling. Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, 2001 UT 77, ^ f 33, 31 P.3d 557. 
"In other words, demonstrating insufficiency of the evidence requires an appealing party to 
show that all the evidence in favor of the [ruling] cannot support the verdict." Id. The 
Bradleys do not show that the trial testimony is so lacking that it cannot support the facts they 
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challenge. They do not show any fatal flaws. They do not show that the Markhams' 
strongest evidence is still insufficient to support the trial court's verdict. 
D. The Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Denial of a New Trial. 
Although the Bradleys attempted to marshal all the evidence, they do not point to any 
evidence showing that the trial court erred in its findings of fact or conclusions of law. The 
Bradleys did not present every scrap of evidence supporting their first identified marshaled 
fact, which reads: 
(1) Mr. Bradley testified that he expected the credit report to be from 
"Experian," one of the three major credit reporting agencies, and not 
the "Landsafe" company shown on the front of the credit report, yet 
while on the witness stand, Mr. Bradley acknowledged that the credit 
report did show the Experian credit score on both of the Markhams and 
that the credit information was gathered from Experian. 
(Br. of Appellant 3142 ; R288 ^  M(i)). The Bradleys' marshaled evidence for this finding 
suggests that Mr. Bradley's mistake was not a result of inadequate review of the credit report, 
but rather that he simply did not understand the acronyms that were used, thereby trying to 
create an impression that the testimony does not support any court finding. This is not the 
case. Testimony to which the Bradleys did not refer indicates: (a) Mr. Bradley said that one 
of the reasons he did not like the credit report was because it was from a group he did not 
recognize (R. 881, TT 312:13-15); (b) Mr. Bradley testified that he would probably have "felt 
differently about getting a report from Experian instead of from Land Save [sic]" (R. 881, 
TT 312:15-17); (c) while on the witness stand Mr. Bradley himself pointed out that the credit 
report clearly states that the acronym XPN stands for Experian and that the credit report is 
a summary from Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union (R. 881, TT 318:21-25; Pis.' Ex. 1, tab 
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5, pg. 12); and (d) Mr. Bradley had experience in evaluating credit reports, having evaluated 
about 50 in the past (R. 881, TT 309:1-3). The reliable testimony at trial does not contradict 
this first fact set. 
The second identified fact set the Bradleys attempt to marshal states: 
(2) The Markhams' credit scores of 689 and 705 were sufficient for 
Countrywide to qualify the Markhams for a loan for twice the amount that the 
Bradleys agreed to finance. I conclude that it would not be objectively 
reasonable for the Bradleys to claim this as a ground to cancel the REPC. 
(Br. of Appellant 31, T| 4; R. 288 ^ M(ii)). The Bradleys' only reference to the Record was 
to the trial exhibits of the credit report and the letter from Countrywide. Not only do these 
two exhibits support the trial court's conclusion, but the Bradleys show no testimony that 
contradicts the trial court. Furthermore, the trial court's Finding of Fact, paragraph 56, (R. 
281) shows its favorable evaluation of the credit report, and paragraph 57 (R. 282) shows that 
there was no evidence to indicate that the credit scores were poor. 
In the third fact identified by the Bradleys, they again fail to include important 
testimony. The statement they challenge states: 
(3) The Bradleys both testified that one of the most important elements in their 
decision to reject the financial information was that it was handwritten on the 
form and looked sloppy and that they would not present such a sloppy form to 
anyone in seeking credit for themselves, yet they testified that they had no 
objection to the information on the report showing the Markhams' monthly 
income or their net worth or their credit scores. I conclude that this objection 
to the form or appearance of the Markhams' papers had nothing to do with the 
merits of the information provided to them, so that it was objectively 
unreasonable for the Bradleys to reject the Markhams' financial information 
on this basis. 
(Br. of Appellant 32, If 1; R. 288 U M(iii)). 
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The trial testimony supports the trial court's conclusions. Mr. Bradley testified that 
the financial statement "bugged us more than the credit - than this - if this is a credit report. 
This financial statement bugged us more." (R. 881, TT 312:20-22). Mr. Bradley stated that 
the reason he did not like the financial statement was all the "white outs." (R. 881, TT 
312:17-25). Mr. Bradley, when asked on redirect about why the financial statement was a 
bigger concern than the credit report, again stated that it was "[j]ust the condition" of the 
documents, that it was not typed. (R. 881, TT 322:1 -8). Mrs. Bradley also listed a concern 
as "the financial statement being whited out and rewritten and - it just was very sloppy." (R. 
881, TT 345:15-16). The Bradleys' attorney referenced in his letter "poor fax copies," 
"sloppy," "package out of order," "missing pages," and the "sheer length of the Consumer 
Credit Report" as the basis for cancelling the sale (Pis. Ex. 1, tab 9). 
The trial court reviewed the exhibits and found that the credit report only had four 
references of late payments, which were only 30 days late, and which occurred in 2001 and 
2003. (R. 281 Tf 56). The financial records show strong income, high net worth, and several 
sources of income - none of which were claimed as inadequate by the Bradleys (Pis. Ex. 1, 
tab 6). Furthermore, the only reason the financial information may have looked sloppy is 
because of the sudden change by the Bradleys. Instead of setting a new deadline with notice 
to the Markhams and indicating a preferred format for the financial information, the Bradleys 
just tried to end the deal with no time for the Markhams to properly prepare the information. 
Therefore, it is not clear error for the trial court to reach its conclusion. 
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The fourth fact as identified by the Bradleys states: 
(4) The Bradleys also testified that they had a concern as to whether 
the Markhams could meet a monthly payment obligation if they could 
not meet the REPC deadline to furnish the financial information, yet the 
Markhams had shown the Bradleys that the Bradleys would not need to 
carry the note for any extended period of time, as the Markhams had 
lined up Countrywide to immediately pay off the seller financing, 
completely eliminating that claimed concern. 
(Br. of Appellant 32-33). 
The Bradleys' only reference to evidence was to the credit report and letter from 
Countrywide. These two documents do not refute this statement, nor do they refer to any 
specific part of these documents to show they contradict the trial court. Therefore, the 
conclusion must stand. The Bradleys do refer to their own self-serving testimony, even 
though the trial court found the Bradleys lacked credibility. "The testimony of Mr. Bradley 
on the critical facts is not credible, but is unreliable." (R. 293 ^ W). The trial court also 
observed that "Mr. Bradley's demeanor at the trail did not convey credibility." (R. 293 ^ f X). 
"Mrs. Bradley's testimony lacks credibility as well." (R. 293 If Y). The trial court also 
observed that Mrs. Bradley's "testimony is not sufficiently credible to refute the testimony 
of Norton and Mr. Markham, the admitted documentary evidence regarding the Markhams' 
credit worthiness, or the evidence that it was unreasonable and in bad faith for her and 
Mr. Bradley to refuse to sell the Property." (R. 294 ^ j Y). 
However, the trial court properly examined the claimed issue - ongoing monthly 
payments - and found that since the Markhams had the contractual right to pay off the seller 
financing early, without penalty, they were within their right to pay it off at closing with 
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another loan. (R. 290 ^ f O). Since the Bradleys had notice that the seller financing would be 
paid off early - the day of closing - there was no reason to be concerned about whether 
ongoing payment would be made. Neither this conclusion nor the underlying facts were 
challenged by the Bradleys. 
The marshaled evidence for the fifth fact set consists solely of a reference to the credit 
report to support the trial court's finding that: 
(5) The credit report shows only four historical delinquencies, all being 
only 30-day delinquencies, and two of them showing the last 
delinquency date in 2003 and two of them showing the last delinquency 
date in 2001, which is a very small and insignificant number of 
delinquencies in comparison to the many timely payments. 
(Br. of Appellant 33). 
The credit report is easily analyzed, and the trial court's summary of the report is 
accurate. The Bradleys have not challenged the credit report itself, nor do they challenge the 
trial court's analysis of the credit report. Therefore, it stands as the true measure of the credit 
history. The credit report does not contradict the trial court's statement. 
The second half of the sixth marshaled fact set reads: "Mrs. Bradley's broker testified 
that she never mentioned a bankruptcy to him until just before their depositions were taken." 
(Br. of Appellant 33, f^ 5; R. 290 |^ M (vi)). The description of the marshaled evidence for 
this finding inaccurately attempts to summarize what the broker stated. The broker was 
asked at trial, "[Mrs. Bradley] had only brought [the bankruptcy] up to you during that week 
just prior to your deposition; isn't that right?" (R. 881, TT 361:14-16), to which the broker 
responded, "correct." (R. 881, TT 361:17). 
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The Bradleys have failed to marshal any contradictory evidence and have omitted 
evidence vital to the trial court's rulings. Based on such failures to marshal, this Court has 
grounds to affirm on this basis alone, or assume that the evidence supports the findings. 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, 1J3 8,140 
P.3d 1200. 
The follow findings which support the trial court's conclusions that the Bradleys 
breached the Covenant are not marshaled, nor are they contradicted by the Bradleys: 
a. Mr. Bradley told Ms. Norton that since Mr. Markham is a doctor, 
Mrs. Markham is a dentist, and he was getting one-half of the purchase price 
as a down payment, he was not worried about the financial information. 
(R. 272-73 U 20). 
b. The reference to the bankruptcy or judgment was from the financial form 
Mr. Markham had used which references Mr. Markham's filing bankruptcy 
over ten years earlier in relation to a business deal in a shared chiropractic 
office. (R. 2811(56). 
c. There was no reference to bankruptcy or judgments on the credit report. (Id.). 
d. Mr. Markham and Mr. Bradley gave their opinions [about the credit scores] 
and there was no objective evidence that such credit scores were poor. (R. 282 
157). 
e. Mr. Jensen's letter came after the Markhams had already tendered their proof 
of financing through Countrywide, and the Markhams were ready and willing 
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to proceed to closing by immediately paying off seller financing. (R. 282 
158). 
During the first week of October, Ms. Norton pulled an additional MLS listing 
on the Property, which shows that on September 9 - three days before the 
scheduled meeting with the Bradleys at the Property - Mr. Bradley had already 
initiated a change to the MLS listing to show it as "withdrawn," and not 
showing that it was under a pending sales contract. Ms. Norton was surprised 
to discover this, because the normal practice in Washington County is to alter 
the MLS listing to show that a sale is "pending" while it is under contract as 
was this one. The change request admitted as evidence shows that Mr. Bradley 
signed and submitted the change on September 9. (R. 282 [^ 59). 
Mrs. Bradley stated to Ms. Norton before even looking at the financial 
information that she never wanted to sell the property and was not going to sell 
it now. (R.288UM). 
Instead of establishing a new date with the Markhams to receive their financial 
information as demanded by Mr. Bradley, the Bradleys sent a notice that the 
Markhams had failed to comply with the September 13 deadline, and therefore 
the Bradleys purported to cancel the REPC. (R. 286 ^ I). 
The Bradleys' so-called evaluation was merely a pretext as they had already 
determined they would not sell the house. (R. 290 ][ N). 
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The Bradleys have failed to marshal all evidence supporting the trial court's findings. 
As shown above, the trial court had ample evidence upon which to base its ruling. 
III. THE BRADLEYS WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO STRICTLY ENFORCE 
THE MARKHAMS' DEADLINE. 
The Bradleys waived two particular rights under the Real Estate Purchase Contract. 
There are three elements to establish waiver: (1) existing right; (2) knowledge of the right; 
and (3) intention to relinquish the right. Soter 's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 857 
P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). The Bradleys appear to only challenge the third element - the 
relinquishment of the right - which can be inferred. Id. at 941 ("a fact finder need only 
determine whether the totality of the circumstances 'warrants the inference of 
relinquishment"') (citation omitted). 
First, the Bradleys waived the deadline by which the Markhams were to perform the 
production of certain financial documents. This waiver was unique and specific as to the 
Markhams. It is not a general waiver of the parties as to all deadlines within the contract, but 
was a specific waiver as to the Markhams' responsibility to perform the production of the 
financial documents. In addition, the Bradleys waived another right under the contract that 
is implicit with this waiver, and that is the right to have an extension set forth in writing. 
The Bradleys' waiver of their right to receive the financial documents could not affect 
any deadlines imposed by the contract on the Bradleys, and the Bradleys would still have to 
perform under the contract according to their requirements and all associated deadlines 
regardless of having waived the Markhams' strict performance under the contract. There was 
no testimony or evidence to even suggest that the Markhams waived the Bradleys' deadline 
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to provide seller disclosures. The Bradleys mistakenly argue that, because they still had 
obligations under the contract and performed them, this Court cannot conclude that they did 
not want the Markhams' deadlines strictly enforced. Their argument simply does not hold 
water, and they point to no case law that would indicate that their waiver of the other parties' 
rights under the contract automatically would alleviate their duty to perform their own 
obligations under the contract. 
In addition, the Bradleys did not ask for an extension in time to review or receive the 
financial documents from the Markhams. They simply refused the documents, demanding 
at least a couple of weeks to pass before they would accept them. Although the Bradleys had 
the right to require the parties to set forth in writing a specific time when the Bradleys would 
accept the financial documents, the Bradleys needed to elect that remedy on September 12 
while the parties were together. 
The trial court did evaluate the "totality of the circumstances," as the credible 
testimony showed. The Bradleys had canceled the listing three days prior to the September 
12 meeting. Mr. Bradley had lost his temper at the time of the September 12 meeting. His 
lack of control over his temper was evident in court as well, which led to the trial court's 
conclusion that Mr. Bradley's demeanor at trial did not convey credibility. (R. 293 ^ X). 
Trial testimony established that Mr. Bradley was angry, refused to accept documents that 
Mr. Markham pulled out of his briefcase and handed to him, and refused to talk about the 
financial information in any format, saying they would not do it until a couple of weeks later. 
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That is what was conveyed in an angry manner at the time of the meeting, and that is what 
was conveyed similarly at the time of trial. 
The Bradleys have pointed to no credible trial testimony that contradicts the findings 
and conclusions. The trial court was correct in an unchallenged conclusion that "it would 
have been a futile act for the Markhams and their real estate agents to continue to try to 
present the financial information to Mr. Bradley on Monday, September 13, after his angry 
refusal on Sunday afternoon." (R. 286 ^  I). The trial court correctly applied Utah law on the 
subject and determined that the Markhams would not be required to do such a futile or 
useless or idle act in the face of Mr. Bradley's actions. Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 
359 (Utah 1990) ("tender requirement may be excused where tender would be an 'idle 
ceremony"'). Moreover, separate from a waiver analysis, a contract analysis causes the same 
result, because "one party may not render it difficult or impossible for the other to continue 
performance and then take advantage of the non-performance he has caused." Zion 's 
Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah 1975). 
A. The Bradleys Raise New Arguments on Appeal to Support Their 
Nonwaiver Argument. 
The Bradleys invent six novel and unsupportable arguments for their appeal which 
were not raised at trial, all in support of their claim that they did not waive the Markhams' 
September 13 deadline. Of the following seven arguments the Bradleys raise, the only one 
raised at trial was that the contract could not be modified orally: 
(1) Undisputed facts establish that both parties performed on the contract as if 
there was not a waiver; 
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(2) The Bradleys did not believe that Mr. Bradley's actions waived their right to 
rely on the September 13 deadline; 
(3) If the Bradleys had waived the deadline, it is unlikely that they would have 
been concerned about delivering the required disclosures to the Markhams by 
the September 13 deadline; 
(4) The trial court ignored the statute of frauds; 
(5) The trial court ignored that Section 14 of the REPC specifically prohibits oral 
modification of its terms; 
(6) Ms. Norton did not understand Mr. Bradley's actions to waive his right to rely 
on the September 13 deadline; 
(7) There can be no distinct, intentional waiver when uncontested evidence shows 
that neither party behaved in a manner consistent with waiver. 
(Br. of Appellant 37-43). In their Statement of the Issues, the Bradleys claim to have 
preserved these arguments. (R. 392-98 and R. 881, TT 405:1-4). A review of these two 
locations in the Record show that the Bradleys did not preserve those arguments below. 
Page 392-98 of the Record are pages from a memorandum supporting the Bradley's 
post-trial motion captioned as being brought pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59. 
However, as pointed out supra, this post-trial motion does not preserve the issue for appeal. 
Furthermore, page 405, lines 1 through 4, of the trial transcript only shows that, in closing 
arguments, the Bradleys claimed there was no written extension as required by the contract. 
They did not raise any of the other points now brought on appeal. 
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As stated supra, an appellant preserves a substantive issue for appeal only if at trial 
the appellant (i) timely raised the issue before the trial court: (ii) specifically raised the issue 
in a way that the issue rises to a level of consciousness before the trial court; and (iii) 
introduced to the trial court supporting evidence or relevant legal authority to support the 
argument. The Bradleys fail each of these three requirements. They failed to give the trial 
court the opportunity to rule on these additional arguments. Therefore, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's determination that Mr. Bradley waived the right to enforce the 
Markhams' September 13 deadline. 
If this Court evaluates this waiver issue, the maximum amount of deference available 
to a mixed question of fact and law is the appropriate standard of review. Whether a party 
has effectuated a waiver is a mixed question of law and fact. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 
Tf 23, 100 P.3d 1177. When reviewing mixed questions, where both findings of fact and 
determinations of law are at issue, the appellate court must determine the appropriate amount 
of deference to give to the trial court. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, \ 24, 144 P.3d 1096. 
There, the Utah Supreme Court revised its guideline to determining the proper standard of 
review to a three-part test: 
(1) The degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal 
rule is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's application 
of the legal rule relies on "facts" observed by the trial judge, "such as 
a witness appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the 
law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to 
appellate courts"; and (3) other policy reasons that weigh for or against 
granting discretion to trial courts. 
Id. at K 25. 
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The greater the variety among fact patterns to which the law is applied, the stronger 
the case for appellate deference. Levin, 2006 UT 50 at ^ f 26. When a variety of fact-intensive 
circumstances are involved, this weighs heavily against the appellate court lightly 
substituting its judgment for that of the trial court. Glew v. Ohio Savings Bank, 2007 UT 56, 
T| 19, 582 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, — P.3d — . In applying the second factor, "the greater the 
importance of the trial court's credibility assessments, that cannot be adequately reflected in 
the Record, the stronger the case for appellate deference." Levin, 2006 UT 50 at \ 26. Here, 
the trial court found that the Bradleys' testimony was not credible, but was unreliable as 
stated above. 
To apply the third factor, the appellate court must take into consideration policy 
factors related to the degree of deference that should be applied. Levin, 2006 UT 50 \ 26. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938-39 (Utah 1994), that 
policy factors favor appellate deference in waiver cases. For a number of years, Utah courts 
"developed hopelessly inconsistent elaborations on the basic statement of waiver principles." 
Id. at 938. When it was clear that continuing to provide such elaborations was futile, the 
statement of the law was stripped back to its most basic form, and trial courts were told to 
apply it. Id. "The net effect was to say that waiver is a highly fact-dependent question, one 
that... cannot... profitably [be] reviewed de novo in every case because [the court] cannot 
hope to work out a coherent statement of the law through a course of. . . decisions." Id. 
(quoting Soter 's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association, 857 P.2d 935, 939 
(Utah 1993)). 
797244v4 36 
Because there is a wide variety of facts to which the legal rule for waiver is applied, 
witness credibility becomes even more critical. The Record adequately reflects the fact that 
the trial court found Mr. and Mrs. Bradley to be noncredible witnesses. As policy reasons 
suggest the need for deference to the trial court's fact-dependent analysis, this Court should 
give the maximum amount of deference available to the trial court's determination that the 
Bradleys waived their right to enforce the September 13 deadline. When that deference is 
combined with the unchallenged findings and trial testimony, the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
B. The Bradleys Have Marshaled No Evidence Suggesting the Trial 
Court's Findings are Incorrect 
Because the question of waiver is so dependent on factual findings, appellants must 
marshal the evidence if they seek to challenge the trial court's determination. United Park 
City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35 at \ 25. As discussed supra, the Bradleys have failed to 
adequately marshal the evidence. 
Specifically, the Bradleys have not pointed to a single instance in the Record that 
contradicts the findings they challenge. For example, the trial court held that "[b]y Mr. 
Bradley's statements and actions, and Mrs. Bradley's intentional and persistent 
unavailability, the Bradleys intentionally waived their known right as to the September 13 
deadline." (R. 285 f H). Yet the Bradleys in their appellate brief state u[u]ndisputed facts 
establish that both parties performed on the contract as if there was not waiver" (Br. of 
Appellant 42, | 8). No citations from the Record are provided to support the Bradleys' 
statement. 
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On the other hand, the trial court's conclusions are supported by the findings of fact, 
which were nol challenged, and the trial testimony: 
a. Mrs. Bradley was out of town and all contact should be through Mr. Bradley. 
(R. 269 If 7). 
b. Mr. Bradley said he would handle the paperwork, as Mrs. Bradley was very 
hard to get in touch with. (R. 272 1f 18). 
c. Mr. Bradley refused to give Mrs. Bradley's phone number to Ms. Norton. 
(R. 272 Tf 18). 
d. Mrs. Bradley did not try to contact Ms. Norton, even after the contract was 
signed. (R. 273 Tf 23). 
e. When Mr. Bradley refused the financial information, Mr. Markham put it back 
into his briefcase and left, knowing he would have to wait to hear from the 
Bradleys about when to submit it. (R. 881, TT 40:15-25). 
f. After the September 12 meeting, Ms. Norton tried to set a new appointment 
with Mr. Bradley by calling and visiting job sites, all to no avail. (R. 278 
141). 
The other marshaled evidence actually supports the trial court's findings and 
conclusions. Because the Bradleys have failed to ferret out any fatal flaw in the evidence, 
this Court should either affirm the trial court's findings or assume that the findings are 
supported by clear weight of evidence. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
BRADLEYS ARE ESTOPPED FROM STRICTLY ENFORCING THE 
SEPTEMBER 13 DEADLINE. 
The concept of waiver and estoppel are equitable remedies that are closely related. 
The trial court concluded that Mr. Bradley's actions not only amounted to waiver, but, 
because of his refusal to discuss finances and Mrs. Bradley's refusal to make herself 
available, the Bradleys would be estopped from strictly enforcing or relying on the 
September 13 deadline for the Markhams to produce their financial information, and that it 
would be inequitable to allow the Bradleys to take advantage of their own obstructive and 
misleading conduct. Therefore, it is appropriate for this Court to estop the Bradleys from 
utilizing their own bad acts to further damage the Markhams. 
Estoppel, in basic terms, is applied when one of the parties later tries to contradict 
themselves from an earlier position taken and, within that contradiction, tries to bring about 
harm or injury to the other party. Brixen v. Elton, 111 P.2d 1039,1043-44 (Utah App. 1989). 
Here, the Bradleys later took the position on September 20 that the Markhams had not 
submitted the financial information before the deadline; therefore, they were canceling the 
contract. This was directly contrary to the Bradleys' earlier action of refusing the financial 
information on September 12, the day before the deadline. The Markhams reasonably relied 
on the Bradleys' statements that they did not want the documents at that time, so Mr. 
Markham put the documents back in his briefcase, returned to his home in California, and 
waited for the notice of the new date to submit the financial information. The Bradleys, 
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rather than contacting Ms. Norton or the Markhams to set a specific date, simply tried to 
cancel the contract. 
There can be no purer example of when estoppel is critical in the field of law than the 
one in this case. To specifically tell another not to provide a document required under a 
contract because the person does not want it and then turn around and tell the other that the 
contract is now void because the document was not delivered simply cannot be tolerated. To 
uphold such action flies in the face of equity and justice, yet that is the argument the Bradleys 
want this Court to accept. 
As previously stated, the trial court observed that Mr. Bradley likely gave false 
testimony at trial to fit a legal theory. Likewise, the Bradleys attempt now to ignore the 
Markhams' and Ms. Norton's testimony at trial and focus only on their own self-serving 
comments appears to be an attempt to form their trial testimony to legal arguments developed 
for the purposes of appeal. However, the Bradleys did not make this type of legal argument 
to the trial court and should not have made it on appeal. 
In their Statement of the Issues, the Bradleys claim to have preserved these arguments, 
suggesting they were not estopped from enforcing the September 13 deadline. (R. 392-98 
and R. 881, TT 405:1-4). A review of these two locations in the Record makes clear that the 
Bradleys have failed to preserve their arguments. Page 392-98 of the Record are pages from 
a memorandum supporting the Bradley's post-trial motion captioned as being brought 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Again, Utah law is clear that raising the issue 
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in a post-trial motion fails to preserve the issue. Likewise, page 405, lines 1 through 4, of 
the trial transcript does not discuss their estoppel argument. 
V. THIS CASE IS THE PERFECT EXAMPLE OF WHY SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE IS APPROPRIATE IN REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACTS. 
The contract between the Markhams and the Bradleys was one for the purchase of real 
estate. Specific performance has long been recognized as an appropriate remedy in Utah 
when a seller of real property refuses to convey the property at issue to the buyer. Kelley v. 
Leucadia Fin. Corp., 846P.2d 1238,1242 (Utah 1992). This is particularly true when a real 
estate contract specifically grants specific performance as an optional remedy. Id. Because 
specific performance sounds in equity, a court has wide discretion in formulating and 
applying it as a remedy. LHIW, Inc. v. DeLorean, 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988). 
The Bradleys claim to have preserved the issue of whether specific performance is an 
appropriate remedy by citing to the Record, pages 395-397, which is part of their New Trial 
Motion. As stated succinctly above, an issue cannot be preserved for appeal when it is 
brought up for the first time in a post-trial motion such as a motion for a new trial. However, 
even if this Court were to allow their New Trial Motion, particularly pages 395-397 of the 
Record, to be a sufficient basis to preserve an issue for appeal, the Bradleys do not even raise 
the issue of whether specific performance is an appropriate remedy under the circumstances. 
The term "specific performance" is not raised in their New Trial Motion. The pages to which 
they refer are those wherein they are arguing whether waiver was appropriately adopted by 
the trial court. In fact, throughout the process of trial preparation and discovery, as well as 
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the trial itself, the Bradleys never questioned whether specific performance was an 
appropriate remedy. Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court regarding its ordering 
specific performance on that basis alone. 
Even if this Court were to conclude that the issue was preserved below and that it is 
properly before this Court now for review, this Court should still affirm the trial court's Final 
Judgment and Order. In a nutshell, the Bradleys argue that the Markhams were required 
under the theory of specific performance to make an unconditional tender of performance on 
the contract. They then apply this legal standard and state that the unconditional tender of 
performance applies to the September 13 deadline to deliver financial information regardless 
of the trial court's legal conclusions on the issue of waiver. In other words, the Bradleys 
argue that, because the Markhams did not have a credit report among their financial 
documents presented on September 12 when the Bradleys refused to even look at them, and 
in spite of Mr. Markham's testimony that they would pull a credit report once the Bradleys 
told them a preference for the source of the credit report, the Markhams were not prepared 
to unconditionally perform by the deadline of September 13. 
First of all, this ignores the factual findings of the trial court and trial testimony that 
established that a credit report can be run very quickly with a few key strokes on the Internet. 
Therefore, the Markhams had all the information they needed in order to proceed with the 
financial information and would have pulled the credit report on September 13. The only 
reason they did not was because they had been told that the Bradleys were not interested in 
their financial information for another couple of weeks. Therefore, they did not pull the 
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report. The Markhams tender on September 12 was proper and adequate. The trial court 
specifically found in paragraph K of the Conclusions of Law (R. 286) that the Markhams' 
production of their financial information was sufficient to meet the contract's requirements 
to timely provide the financial information, including the credit report. The Bradleys have 
not challenged that conclusion on appeal and have done nothing to marshal and contradict 
that conclusion. 
In addition, the Markhams informed Mr. Bradley that they had all of the financial 
information and could request and print out a credit report the next morning on September 13 
and get that to him as well. (R. 278). It was in light of all of this information presented to 
Mr. Bradley that he rejected the financial information in toto. The Markhams had tendered 
performance by September 13 and were fully capable and ready to complete that tender had 
the Bradleys not rejected the financial information on September 12 and told the Markhams 
to wait a couple of weeks. Therefore, the Markhams are entitled to the remedy of specific 
performance. 
VI. ATTORNEYS' FEES WERE AWARDED BELOW AND SHOULD BE 
AWARDED ON APPEAL. 
The underlying contract between the Markhams and the Bradleys allows for the 
prevailing party to recover attorneys' fees. The trial court awarded the Markhams their 
attorneys' fees incurred through trial in its original Final Judgment and Order. In addition, 
the trial court awarded the Markhams their further attorneys' fees incurred in dealing with 
the post-trial motions brought by the Bradleys. Likewise, on appeal the Markhams have 
797244v4 43 
again incurred attorneys' fees and this Court should award the Markhams their attorneys' 
fees as the prevailing party on appeal. Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial court in all respects, deny 
each of the issues raised by the Bradleys on appeal, and award the Markhams their fees and 
costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this JO day of August, 2007. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, PC 
Russell S. Mitchell fyuJ 0 
Attorneys for Plaintiff&Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM A: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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203$rnsi* PMi2:m 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF uA 
DOUGLAS J MARKHAM and 
ANDREA MARKHAM, 
vs. 
JOHN J. BRADLEY and 
DARBY G. BRADLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 040501848 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This case came before me for trial on January 24 and 25, 2006. Plaintiffs appeared in 
person and were represented by their counsel of record, Russell S. Mitchell. Defendants 
appeared in person and were represented by their counsel of record, Aaron D. Randall. I heard 
the testimonies of Douglas Markham, Carolyn Norton, Stuart Shumway, John Bradley, Darby 
Bradley, and Roger Hamblin. I allowed counsel to submit proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law after the trial. I have now reviewed and considered the testimonies of the 
witnesses, the exhibits received into evidence, and the arguments of counsel. Due to the direct 
contradictions among the witnesses' testimonies, the witnesses' credibility has been a significant 
concern for me. On this basis, I have made the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs Douglas J. Markham and Andrea Markham ("Markhams") became 
interested in the Washington County area for a second home and possible early retirement area. 
2. They retained real estate agents, Carolyn Norton ("Norton") and Stuart Shumway 
("Shumway"), to help them locate properties in the St. George area. 
3. On Friday, August 27, 2004, Norton took the Markhams out to show them the 
Washington area generally and, after viewing many properties, ended up in the Dammeron 
Valley area and saw a "for sale" sign on the property located at 979 North Dammeron Valley 
Drive (the "Property"). The Markhams immediately liked the Property and asked Norton to get 
more information about it. Later that evening, the Markhams drove back to Dammeron Valley to 
drive by and again look at the Property. 
4. By the next day, Saturday, August 28, Norton had pulled up the Multiple Listing 
Service ("MLS") information for the Property and saw that it was listed with an "owner/agent," 
being Defendant Darby Bradley ("Mrs. Bradley"). 
5. Norton called the number for Mrs. Bradley shown in the MLS printout, and 
Defendant John Bradley ("Mr. Bradley"), the co-owner, answered the phone. He stated that Mrs. 
Bradley was out of town, but that he could show the Property and home and agreed to show the 
home that Saturday morning. 
6. Norton and the Markhams went to the Property and met Mr. Bradley. 
7. While doing the walk-through, Mr. Bradley told the Markhams and Norton that 
his wife was out of town and that all contact regarding the Property should be directed through 
him and that he v/ould pass all information and required documents on to Mrs. Bradley. 
8. Mr. Bradley was very friendly and cordial and took them through the house, 
showing them the improvements he was making, including some remodeling of the kitchen. He 
stated that he was a builder and did new home construction under the name of Pride Homes. 
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They spent well over an hour at the Property with Mr. Bradley. While there: 
a. Norton asked the price, to which Mr. Bradley replied that it was listed at 
$650,000.00, but they were willing to take $550,000.00. 
b. Mr. Bradley pulled out a map of the Property, and showed them the 
boundaries of the Property and that it was already sub-divided into three 
parcels. 
c. Mr. Bradley also stated he was willing to sell some of the special-order 
furniture in the home. 
d. The Markhams told Mr. Bradley that they were interested in building one 
or two more homes for Mr. Markham's retiring brother and to allow his 
mother to live close as well. 
e. Mr. Bradley gave Mr. Markham his business card showing his business 
name and phone number. 
9. While at the Property that day, the Markhams fell in love with the Property and its 
unique characteristics, such as the log-style home, horse corrals, pond, and the ability to build 
additional homes for family. They decided they wanted to purchase the Property. 
10. After the first walk-through and after the Markhams returned to California, Mr. 
Markham then called Mr. Bradley directly by phone on or about August 30 telling him they 
wanted to buy the Property and asking what the Bradleys wanted for the Property. 
11. Mr. Bradley told Mr. Markham that they could do the deal directly without 
involving Norton, but Mr. Markham insisted that Norton be involved. 
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12. There was no negotiation regarding the sales price. Mr. Bradley stated they 
wanted $550,000.00 for the Property, and the Markhams agreed. Mr. Bradley also stated he 
needed $265,000.00 down in order to buy out a partner, and that the Bradleys could carry the 
balance as seller financing. Mr. Bradley did not insist on or even suggest an interest rate for the 
seller financing, nor did he discuss any detail with Mr. Markham about why he suggested seller 
financing. Mr. Markham was not opposed to seller financing as long as he had the right to pay it 
off early at any time without penalty. 
13. During this phone call, Mr. Markham discussed his intended use of the Property, 
including the building of two additional homes for Mr. Markham's brother and Mr. Markham's 
mother. They talked about the Bradleys' request that their daughter be able to keep her horses on 
the Property after the sale in exchange for taking care of horses the Markhams intended to 
purchase. They also discussed Mr. Bradley's new home construction business and whether he 
would be available to build two additional homes. 
14. After their phone conversations, Mr. Markham then called Norton to have her 
prepare a written offer in the form of a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") consistent with 
the terms Mr. Bradley and Mr. Markham had discussed. 
15. As Mr. Markham and Norton discussed the terms of the REPC, they discussed the 
seller financing issue. Mr. Markham wanted to make sure he could pay off the balance at any 
time without penalty, and Norton told him the standard language of the REPC provided for this 
and that she would not write the offer up any other way. Norton also suggested an interest rate of 
5.5% because the Markhams could easily qualify for the best rates on traditional financing and, 
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therefore, should not pay any more interest than the current common rate. 
16. The REPC prepared by Norton on behalf of the Markhams set the purchase price 
at $550,000.00, with $265,000.00 cash due at closing, while permitting seller financing of 
$285,000.00 at 5.5% interest on a 15-year term, requiring a $100,000.00 balloon payment at the 
end of the first year, and utilizing the standard Seller Financing Addendum. It also provided for 
the parties to meet in early September to discuss remodeling issues and finalize what furniture 
would stay with the house. 
17. Norton and Shumway presented the written REPC offer to Mr. Bradley at one of 
his construction job sites. Norton asked how they could contact Mrs. Bradley to present the 
written REPC offer to her, and Mr. Bradley told Norton that Mrs. Bradley was living in 
Bellingham, Washington, and was seeking a divorce from him. He further stated that the divorce 
was not a friendly matter, but that he would make sure she got the REPC and see if he could get 
it accepted. 
18. Mr. Bradley again affirmed that he would be handling the paperwork, as it was 
very difficult to contact Mrs. Bradley. However, Mr. Bradley would not give Shumway or 
Norton any contact information for Mrs. Bradley at that time. 
19. At the time Norton and Shumway presented the written REPC offer to Mr. 
Bradley, Norton discussed the Seller Financing Addendum with Mr. Bradley and the fact that 
they did not have the Markhams' financial information with the offer, but would be providing it 
later in whatever form the Bradleys wanted to designate. 
20. Mr. Bradley told Norton that since Mr. Markham is a doctor, Mrs. Markham is a 
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dentist, and he was getting one-half of the purchase price as a down payment, he was not worried 
about the financial information. 
21. Norton, who has an educational background in banking and finance, had 
completed this standard Seller Financing Addendum showing the monthly payments as well as 
the effect of the $100,000.00 balloon payment on the monthly payments, as she is fully capable 
of calculating amortization schedules, monthly payments, interest, and other financing matters 
associated with the regular purchase of residential real estate. 
22. Shortly after presenting the REPC to Mr. Bradley and after he had reviewed it 
with Mrs. Bradley, Mr. Bradley presented a written counteroffer back to Norton which the 
Bradleys had both signed demanding a $10,000.00 earnest money payment, increasing the 
amount of down payment by another $10,000.00, and reducing the amount of the seller financing 
to $265,000.00. The sales price of $550,000.00 and interest rate of 5.5%, as well as the standard 
terms of the Seller Financing Addendum, remained unchanged. 
23. Mrs. Bradley did not call Norton regarding the offer or counteroffer, even though 
Mrs. Bradley was listed as the selling agent. Mrs. Bradley did not question the use of the 
standard Seller Financing Addendum, nor did she give any instruction or direction to Norton to 
deliver papers to her broker's office rather than going through Mr. Bradley. 
24. The Markhams signed the counteroffer, and Norton called Mr. Bradley to let him 
know. After the REPC was fully accepted and executed, the Markhams immediately sent a 
check for the $10,000.00 earnest money deposit, which is still deposited with Century 21 at the 
Rockies. 
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25. After several tries, Norton was able to deliver a copy of the fully signed REPC to 
Mr. Bradley around September 4, 2004. At this time, Norton scheduled the follow-up meeting 
with Mr. Bradley for September 12. 
26. Norton set the date for September 12 because the following day, September 13, 
was the deadline for producing financial information. Norton discussed the need and purposes 
for the meeting with the Markhams as well as with Mr. Bradley, the purposes being to go over 
the financial information and two of the other contingency items listed in the REPC regarding 
finishing the remodeling of the home and what furniture the Bradleys would want to sell along 
with the house, as well to go over house plans for the other two homes the Markhams wanted to 
build on the Property. 
27. After presenting the REPC, Norton spoke with Mr. Bradley several times 
regarding the upcoming meeting as well as other matters. During one of the conversations, Mr. 
Bradley asked Norton to find some vacant lots for him on which he could possibly build homes. 
Norton deferred the request, telling him that he should be getting that information from his wife, 
to which Mr. Bradley responded that he wanted Norton to do it because of the difficult divorce he 
was having with his wife. In these various conversations and meetings over the next several 
days: 
a. Norton did find some MLS listings of vacant lots and delivered them to 
Mr. Bradley prior to the September 12 meeting, and again confirmed the 
upcoming meeting. 
b. In one of the conversations, Mr. Bradley told Norton that he wanted to 
7 
extend the closing time by at least a month, as he was having trouble 
getting the remodeling done and would not be able to complete it in time, 
asking Norton to prepare an addendum for him to sign. 
c. In response to Mr. Bradley's desire to extend the closing deadline, Norton 
gained permission from the Markhams to extend the date and prepared 
part of an addendum, telling Mr. Bradley that he would need to fill it out 
in full, sign it, and present it back to the Markhams, as it would be 
considered a counteroffer from the Bradleys. 
d. During one of the conversations, Mr. Bradley stated that the September 12 
meeting could not be so early in the afternoon and asked that it be set 
around 4:00 or 5:00 p.m., at which time Norton again emphasized to Mr. 
Bradley the critical nature of the September 12 meeting to review financial 
information, go over house plans, check the status of the remodeling, and 
determine which items of furniture the Bradleys would want to sell. 
e. During this time, prior to the September 12 meeting, there were other 
conversations in person and on the phone between Norton and Mr. Bradley 
which were very friendly and cordial and during which he expressed a 
desire to continue to have his daughter have horse stables on the Property, 
even after the sale of the Property had closed. The Markhams had stated 
they had no problem with this and were willing to work out terms to 
accommodate his daughter's desires in that regard. 
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28. In preparing for the upcoming meeting, Norton told the Markhams they needed to 
bring financial information with them for the September 12 meeting with the Bradleys. 
29. When the Markhams arrived in St. George on September 12, they first met with 
Norton in her office. Mr. Markham had a briefcase from which he pulled a stack of papers with 
his financial information at the top of the stack. Mrs. Norton saw the financial information, 
although she did not review it in detail at that time. 
30. Later in the afternoon, the Markhams then went to the Property with Norton and 
Shumway. They were also accompanied by Mr. Markham's brother, Dirk Markham, and his 
wife, who had flown in from New York, as one of the homes to be built was for Dirk Markham. 
31. They went to the Property a little early to see if Mr. Bradley might have arrived 
home early and, when he was not home, left the Property and came back again around 4:30 or 
5:00 p.m. This second time they came by the Property, Mr. Bradley was there, but instead of 
greeting them with the same cordial and friendly attitude he had in the past, he approached them 
yelling at Norton, "What the hell are you doing here?" He also yelled about there being no 
appointment. 
32. This behavior shocked the Markhams, and they were not sure what to do. Norton 
continued to talk to Mr. Bradley to calm him down, and while she was doing this, Shumway took 
the Markhams to walk around the outside of the Property. Norton reminded Mr. Bradley that 
they did have an appointment at this scheduled time and that it was very important to go over the 
financial information, the house plans, the remodeling, and the furniture issues. 
33. Norton reminded Mr. Bradley that the Markhams were not only buying the 
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Property, but were looking to him as the most likely builder of the two additional homes they 
wanted to build on this eight-acre parcel and that he should get control of his emotions and 
proceed with the meeting they had planned. 
34. Mr. Bradley did finally acknowledge the appointment and the meeting and 
apologized to the Markhams for his rude behavior. He explained to them that he had just 
returned from meeting with attorneys regarding the divorce and it was not going well. 
35. Mr. Markham tried to reassure Mr. Bradley that they did not want to add to his 
apparent problem of a difficult divorce and if he did not want to sell furniture, it was okay, but 
they did want to talk about the financial and other issues. 
36. Inside the home, Mr. Markham set his briefcase on a table just inside the house. 
He opened it up and took out his stack of papers, including the financial information at the top of 
the stack. 
37. Mr. Markham had information and records with him at that time, including the 
following: 
a A prior financial statement Mr. Markham had prepared and submitted to a 
bank regarding a financial transaction unrelated to this matter, which Mr. 
Markham was going to use to transfer updated information to a financial 
statement form of the Bradleys' choice. 
b. A sample form from Mr. Markham's bank that could be completed with 
the Markhams' financial information if the Bradleys decided to adopt such 
a form. 
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c. Additional bank records and statements from which the Markhams could 
obtain any needed account information. 
In addition, the Markhams informed Mr. Bradley that they had all of the necessary 
information to request and print out a credit report the next morning on September 13 and could 
get that to him as well. 
38. Mr. Bradley was still angry, however, and said he did not have time for any of the 
financial information and refused to take any of it or even look at it. He told them that they had 
walked through the house, that was all he could do, and they would need to arrange a time to deal 
with the financial and other matters later. 
39. Norton again told him that now is time to discuss these matters, that the 
Markhams had prepared all of their financial information, and that they were here ready, willing, 
and able to go over whatever questions he might have or fill out whatever forms he needed, but 
Mr. Bradley said he would deal with it in "a couple of weeks." 
40. It was an uncomfortable situation for the Markhams, Norton, and Shumway. 
They were at the home less than 30 minutes and they left. 
41. Norton tried to set the new meeting date by calling Mr. Bradley and dropping by 
the house and work project sites to catch Mr. Bradley. However, she was unable to find him, and 
her calls went unanswered. 
42. Finally, approximately one week later on September 20, Norton received a faxed 
letter claiming that the Bradleys were declaring the REPC null and void and that they wanted to 
cancel the deal based on the fact that the Markhams had failed to provide the required financial 
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information on September 13. 
43. Norton called Mr. Bradley to see what the problem was and was able to talk to 
him. He said it v/as all Mrs. Bradley, as she is the one who wanted to cancel the deal. He stated 
that Mrs. Bradley had come back to St. George and was now going to live in the house. 
44. Norton reminded Mr. Bradley that she still did not have any contact information 
for Mrs. Bradley and would be unable to talk to her unless Mr. Bradley gave her good contact 
information, at which time Mr. Bradley finally gave Norton a cell phone number for Mrs. 
Bradley. 
45. Norton called Mrs. Bradley, left a message, and Mrs. Bradley later returned the 
call, at which time Norton asked her what she felt it would take to make this deal actually work. 
Norton told Mrs. Bradley that the Markhams had tried to give all of the financial information to 
Mr. Bradley and tried to go over it with him, to which she simply replied "Well, I didn't have the 
information that day." She further went on to state that she "never wanted to sell the Property, 
anyway," that she was "not going to sell the Property now," and that the Markhams "missed the 
deadline." 
46. In this conversation with Norton, Mrs. Bradley did not give any instructions to 
alter the delivery of documents to the Bradleys from the existing arrangement of going through 
Mr. Bradley and using the fax number and addresses previously used. 
47. The Markhams refused to accept the Bradleys' attempt to cancel the REPC, 
because they had tried to provide the financial information on September 12 and Mr. Bradley had 
refused it and had told them not to give it to him for a couple of weeks. 
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48. After learning of the September 20 letter, the Markhams immediately contacted 
Countrywide Home Loans ("Countrywide"), which had just approved a home equity loan on the 
Markhams' California residence. Countrywide printed a credit report and began processing a 
loan application for the Property in case it was needed. 
49. Mr. Markham immediately began updating the financial statement he had used for 
an earlier bank loan, but, because of the rush to get the information in as quickly as possible, he 
was unable to locate a blank form and had to use white-out to update the various figures on a 
previously used form in order to provide current information. 
50. The Markhams faxed this financial information from their home fax machine to 
Norton. Because of the size of the fax, they had trouble getting the fax to go through properly 
and had to re-fax many of the pages. Norton assembled the information and credit report as 
received by fax. 
51. On September 24, Norton prepared and faxed a letter to the Bradleys stating that 
the Markhams rejected the Bradleys' attempt to cancel the REPC. Norton also sent the financial 
information and credit report to the Bradleys with this September 24 letter, as well as informing 
them that the Markhams had obtained independent financing to fully pay the purchase price and 
were ready, willing, and able to close under the REPC. 
52. Norton did not hear back from the Bradleys, so she faxed another letter dated 
September 27. Unknown to the Markhams or Norton, Mrs. Bradley had returned to Washington 
and Mr. Bradley was also out of town. 
53. Norton continued to try to reach the Bradleys, and Mr. Bradley finally called 
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Norton and left a message on September 30 that she should direct all further communications to 
their attorney, Robert M. Jensen. By September 30, the Markhams had received formal 
notification from Countrywide that they were approved for a loan on the Property. On 
September 30, Norton faxed a letter to the Bradleys and their attorney with a copy of this 
notification from Countrywide. 
54. The Bradleys received and reviewed all letters and the financial information. 
They then met with Mr. Jensen and instructed him to send another notice to cancel the REPC. 
55. Mr. Jensen sent a letter dated October 4 stating that his clients would not close on 
the REPC, claiming that the Bradleys were excused from doing so because they had not received 
the financial information by September 13. He also claimed that the financial information they 
received was difficult to read and of poor fax quality, the pages seemed out of order, and the 
Bradleys were uncomfortable with a reference to a bankruptcy or judgment, and therefore they 
were canceling the REPC. 
56. The credit report sent to and received by the Bradleys is straightforward in 
showing the credit history and a high credit score of 689 for Mr. Markham and 705 for Mrs. 
Markham. It also shows references to full on-time payments with only four instances of late 
payments, all four being only 30 days late, two times in 2003 and two times in 2001. The 
reference to the bankruptcy or judgment was from the financial form Mr. Markham had used that 
did not limit the time period regarding bankruptcies and was a reference to Mr. Markham's filing 
bankruptcy over ten years earlier in relation to a business deal in a shared chiropractic office. 
There was no reference to bankruptcy or judgments on the credit report. 
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57. No expert witness was called to establish whether the Markhams' credit scores 
were good or poor, although Mr. Markham and Mr. Bradley gave their opinions and there was no 
objective evidence that such credit scores were poor. 
58. Mr. Jensen's letter came after the Markhams had already tendered their proof of 
financing through Countrywide and the Markhams were ready and willing to proceed to closing 
by immediately paying off seller financing. 
59. During the first week of October, Norton pulled an additional MLS listing on the 
Property, which shows that on September 9, three days before the scheduled meeting with the 
Bradleys at the Property, Mr. Bradley had already initiated a change to the MLS listing to show it 
as "withdrawn," and not showing that it was under a pending sales contract. Norton was 
surprised to discover this, because the normal practice in Washington County is to alter the MLS 
listing to show that a sale is "pending" while it is under contract as was this one. The change 
request admitted as evidence shows that Mr. Bradley signed and submitted the change on 
September 9. 
60. Countrywide sent an appraiser to the Property during October, but Mr. Bradley 
turned him away. 
61. Because of these breaches by the Bradleys, the Markhams have had to retain legal 
counsel to protect their rights and interest in the Property and have incurred attorneys' fees and 
costs in protecting their rights, and the REPC provides for the prevailing party to be awarded 
attorneys' fees and costs. 
62. To protect their property rights, the Markhams obtained a Temporary Restraining 
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Order, which was later changed by stipulation to a Stipulated Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction, prohibiting the Bradleys from transferring the Property or doing anything 
to damage the Property or the landscaping. 
63. In violation of the Court's Order, beginning sometime in July 2005, the Bradleys 
have brought over 300 truckloads full of rock, debris, and dirt and dumped them on the Property, 
treating it as a type of holding property for excavation of materials from a different lot on which 
Mr. Bradley is working. 
64. Mrs. Bradley was asked during her deposition in September 2005 if she would 
remove that debris and rock from the Property during the next 30 days, which she agreed to do. 
However, 30 days later, the rock had not been removed. 
65. The Bradleys did not remove any of the dirt, rock, or debris during September, 
October, or November. During the last few weeks prior to the trial, they may have begun to 
remove some of the material, but well over 100 truckloads of dirt, rock, and debris remain on the 
Property in violation of the Court's Order. 
66. Testimony at trial established that it will cost approximately $30,000 to have the 
remaining dirt, rock, and debris removed from the Property. Therefore, it is appropriate to have 
$30,000 held in escrow out of the sales price of the Property to cover the cost of removing all of 
the rock and debris and restoring the Property to its original condition. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. The parties stipulated and the evidence establishes that Mr. Bradley had authority 
to speak for both himself and Mrs. Bradley and was designated to receive all communication and 
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documents regarding sale of the Property. Mrs. Bradley did not designate her broker, Roger 
Hamblin, or any other sales agent to act on her behalf or to receive or initiate communications or 
documents while she was out of town. 
B. Neither the Markhams nor their real estate agents ever received any notice, 
directive, or request from the Bradleys that their communications or documents should be sent 
through Mrs. Bradley's broker's office. Therefore, it was appropriate for the Markhams and their 
real estate agents to deal directly with Mr. Bradley for communications, including the delivery 
and/or exchange of documents. 
C. The evidence establishes that the method of communication to Mrs. Bradley was 
through Mr. Bradley by calling his cell phone, by fax transmission and, when feasible, by 
personal delivery to Mr. Bradley at one of his work sites or at the Property. At no time were the 
Markhams or their real estate agents required to provide documents to Mrs. Bradley's real estate 
broker's office. 
D. Mr. Bradley's verbal representations and specific acts directed to the Markhams 
and their real estate agents are binding on both Mr. and Mrs. Bradley. 
E. The REPC is a binding agreement between the parties and it includes the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
F. The original settlement date set forth in the REPC was October 29, 2004, and the 
Markhams were ready, willing, and able to perform in foil then and are ready, willing, and able to 
perform in foil now. 
G. One of the Bradley's rights under the REPC is timely performance of all 
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deadlines, and the Bradleys knew of those deadlines and their associated rights. The knowledge 
of a contract right may be inferred by the party's signature on a contract. See, e.g., John Call 
Eng'g, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Utah 1987). 
H. The Bradleys waived their right to rely on the September 13, 2004 deadline 
because (1) the Markhams, through their agent, set up a September 12 meeting with Mr. Bradley 
to discuss their financial information, (2) Mr. Bradley was aware of the meeting and its purpose 
and had lead the Markhams and Norton to believe that he was the only contact person for the 
sellers, (3) Mr. Bradley did meet briefly with the Markhams and their real estate agents on 
September 12, but when Mr. Markham tried to present the financial paperwork, Mr. Bradley 
refused to take the documents and said that he did not want anyone to talk to him about it for "a 
couple of weeks," and (4) despite being the listing agent for the Property, Mrs. Bradley had never 
made herself available to discuss anything about the REPC prior to the deadline. By Mr. 
Bradley's statements and actions, and Mrs. Bradley's intentional and persistent unavailability, the 
Bradleys intentionally waived their known right as to the September 13 deadline. See Soter 's 
Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass }n., 857 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). Furthermore, due to 
Mr. Bradley's refusal to talk about the issue and Mrs. Bradley's refusal to make herself available, 
the Bradleys are estopped to rely on the September 13 deadline; it would be inequitable to allow 
the Bradleys to take advantage of their own obstructive and misleading conduct. The Court 
concludes that, under the totality of the circumstances, the Bradleys relinquished their contractual 
right to a strict adherence to the September 13 deadline. See also IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. 
D&K Mgmt., Inc., 2003 UT 5, K 7, 73 P.3d 320 (quoting Soter *s9 857 P.2d at 942). 
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I. Based upon Mr. Bradley's angry attitude and his statement that a new meeting 
time, no sooner than "a couple of weeks," would be needed for him to receive the financial 
documents, it was both appropriate and reasonable for the Markhams and their real estate agents 
to not provide any financial documents, including a credit report, until such time as the new 
meeting time was set. It would have been a futile act for the Markhams and their real estate 
agents to continue to try to present the financial information to Mr. Bradley on Monday, 
September 13, after his angry refusal on Sunday afternoon. The Markhams were not required to 
do a useless act by making a further attempt to tender financial information on September 13. 
Furthermore, the Bradleys had accepted the REPC and Seller Financing Addendum without a 
Buyer Financial Information Sheet, thereby waiving the right to receive financial information in 
that particular form. 
J. Instead of establishing a new date with the Markhams to receive their financial 
information as demanded by Mr. Bradley, the Bradleys sent a notice that the Markhams had 
failed to comply with the September 13 deadline, and therefore the Bradleys purported to cancel 
the REPC. This act by the Bradleys was in breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, as they had already waived strict compliance with this deadline. 
K. Because of the circumstances of receiving the September 20 cancellation letter, 
the Markhams felt rushed and pressed for time to assemble all financial information and 
complete a form to submit. In this rushed activity, the Markhams obtained a credit report from a 
company in California, sent it along with a financial information form that they had used in a 
prior transaction by hurriedly using white-out to be able to handwrite in up-to-date information 
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regarding their financial condition, and faxed all of this from their home fax machine to their 
realtor in an effort to provide the information as quickly as possible. This was sufficient to meet 
the REPC requirement to timely provide the financial information, including the credit report. 
To the extent this resulted in the "sloppy" appearance complained of by the Bradleys, the 
appearance was due, at least in part, to the Bradleys' attempt to cancel the REPC rather than set 
up the new meeting as Mr. Bradley had demanded. However, the form of the financial 
information does not change the substance. 
L. Paragraph 8 of the Seller Financing Addendum to the REPC states that the 
purpose of the credit report and the financial information to be provided by the Markhams was to 
allow the Bradleys to evaluate the "credit worthiness" of the Markhams. The provisions of 
paragraph 8.1 should not be read to create an unfettered right to cancel the REPC regardless of 
credit worthiness, because then the Bradleys would not have made a promise to perform anything 
and their promises under the REPC would be illusory. Therefore, the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing required that the Bradleys, in evaluating the acceptability of the financial 
information and credit report, must do so in good faith and with regard to the merits of the 
information provided. Since paragraph 8 states that the purpose of evaluating the financial 
information is to determine the credit worthiness of the Markhams, the Bradleys were required, 
in good faith, to evaluate for that purpose and not merely go through the motions as a pretext and 
then cancel the REPC. Furthermore, the Bradleys were required to exercise their rights under the 
REPC in a way so as not to deny the Markhams the "expected benefit of [their] bargain." See, 
e.g., Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. Ltd. v. Smith's Food and Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445,450 
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(UtahApp. 1994). 
M. By the time the Bradleys had sent the first notice on September 20, 2004, they had 
determined they no longer wanted to sell the Property to the Markhams. Mrs. Bradley stated to 
Norton that she never wanted to sell the Property. Once the Bradleys received the financial 
information from the Markhams, their review of it was not done in good faith. Rather, it was an 
attempt to put form over substance, as shown by the following: 
i. Mr. Bradley testified that he expected the credit report to be from 
"Experian," one of the three major credit reporting agencies, and not the 
"Landsafe" company shown on the front of the credit report, yet while on 
the witness stand, Mr. Bradley acknowledged that the credit report did 
show the Experian credit score on both of the Markhams and that the 
credit information was gathered from Experian. 
ii. The Markhams' credit scores of 689 and 705 were sufficient for 
Countrywide to qualify the Markhams for a loan for twice the amount that 
the Bradleys agreed to finance. I conclude that it would not be objectively 
reasonable for the Bradleys to claim this as a ground to cancel the REPC. 
iii. The Bradleys both testified that one of the most important elements in 
their decision to reject the financial information was that it was 
handwritten on the form and looked sloppy and that they would not 
present such a sloppy form to anyone in seeking credit for themselves, yet 
they testified that they had no objection to the information on the report 
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showing the Markhams' monthly income or their net worth or their credit 
scores. I conclude that this objection to the form or appearance of the 
Markhams5 papers had nothing to do with the merits of the information 
provided to them, so that it was objectively unreasonable for the Bradleys 
to reject the Markhams* financial information on this basis. 
iv. The Bradleys also testified that they had a concern as to whether the 
Markhams could meet a monthly payment obligation if they could not 
meet the REPC deadline to furnish the financial information, yet the 
Markhams had shown the Bradleys that the Bradleys would not need to 
carry the note for any extended period of time, as the Markhams had lined 
up Countrywide to immediately pay off the seller financing, completely 
eliminating that claimed concern. 
v. The credit report shows only four historical delinquencies, all being only 
30-day delinquencies, and two of them showing the last delinquency date 
in 2003 and two of them showing the last delinquency date in 2001, which 
is a very small and insignificant number of delinquencies in comparison to 
the many timely payments. 
vi.. In the "Notice of Cancellation" from their attorney, the Bradleys' only 
specific comment on the merits of the Markhams' credit-worthiness was as 
to "the admission of bankruptcy or judgment." The evidence established 
that Countrywide did not consider this ten- or twelve-year-old bankruptcy 
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to disqualify the Markhams from a loan for twice the amount that the 
Bradleys agreed to finance. Furthermore, Mrs. Bradley's broker testified 
that she never mentioned a bankruptcy to him until just before their 
depositions were taken. I conclude that it was not objectively reasonable 
for the Bradleys to claim this as a ground to cancel the REPC. 
N. It was unreasonable for the Bradleys to reject the Markhams' credit worthiness 
based on the documents presented to them. The Bradleys did not rely on credit worthiness 
issues. Rather, their "evaluation" was a pretext to cancel the REPC because they had already 
changed their minds about selling. This was in breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. 
0. The REPC included the Seller Financing Addendum with its standard language 
giving the Markhams the right to pay the full seller-financed amount prior to maturity without 
penalty. The Bradleys did not counteroffer or otherwise require any change to this provision to 
mandate that they be able to collect interest over a period of time for an investment purpose. 
Therefore, the Bradleys did not have any contractual expectation to receive payments over a 
period of time or to collect any interest on the note. The Markhams had the right to pay off the 
amount to be seller financed as early as they wanted, and to do so without penalty. It is a breach 
of the "without penalty" clause and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing for the Bradleys to refuse to close when they could have received a full payment of the 
amount of seller financing at closing or soon thereafter, whichever they wished. 
P. It was unreasonable for the Bradleys to reject the Markhams' financial 
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information on the basis of a conclusion that the Markhams would pose an unreasonable credit 
risk, for seller-financing of less than one-half of the purchase price of the Property, after the 
Markhams would have paid more than one-half of the purchase price in cash. Therefore, the 
Bradleys also breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by unreasonably and 
improperly rejecting the financial information and refusing to close. 
Q. The Bradleys have breached the REPC and the Markhams have requested and are 
entitled to the remedy of specific performance. Real estate is assumed to possess the necessary 
qualities to impose specific performance. Specific performance has long been recognized as an 
appropriate remedy in Utah when a seller of real property refuses to convey the property at issue 
to the buyer. Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1242 (Utah 1992). Furthermore, the 
REPC specifically provides for the remedy of specific performance to the Markhams. In 
addition, the unique aspects of the Property include: 
i. The Property was already subdivided into three (3) parcels, which the 
Markhams were interested in using for their mother and a brother to be 
able to join them on the Property, 
ii. The Property has horse corrals already on it and is zoned for the use of 
horses, 
iii. There is a pond on the Property, 
iv. There is a total of 8.25 acres. 
R. Under the terms of the REPC, the Markhams are entitled to recover their 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in these proceedings, and furthermore are entitled to have 
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attorneys' fees and costs offset against the final purchase price to be paid. The Markhams should 
submit a bill of costs and an attorneys' fee affidavit pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and the final judgment will be entered after determining the amount of attorneys' fees 
and costs to be offset against the purchase price of $550,000.00. 
S. Had the Bradleys acted reasonably in evaluating the Markhams' credit score and 
financial information, they would have had approximately 30 days prior to closing to move out of 
the Property. Therefore, it would be fair and equitable for the judgment in this matter to also 
include that closing will occur within 30 days of the entry of the judgment. 
T. The Markhams also obtained a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction and the Bradleys stipulated to its terms. Under its terms, the Bradleys were prohibited 
from bringing any material onto the Property for any reason or for any type of excavation or 
grading work. 
U. In violation of the Court's order, the Bradleys brought approximately 300 
truckloads of dirt, debris, and rock onto the Property. Furthermore, after being advised of this 
violation and request being made to have the rock and debris removed, the Bradleys continued to 
store the debris on the Property and refused to remove all of the debris, only starting to finally 
remove some of the material in the few weeks just prior to trial. Therefore, the Court concludes 
that the Bradleys are in contempt of court, and the Markhams are entitled to their attorneys' fees 
relating to this contempt of court. Furthermore, given the potential cost for the removal of the 
debris, $30,000.00 of the sales price should be held back in escrow from the sale proceeds until 
all of the rock and debris are removed. After closing of the sale, all costs incurred by the 
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Markhams to have the rock and debris removed should be charged against this escrow account, 
with invoices being submitted directly to the escrow company and the escrow company paying 
such invoices for the removal. Once the rock and debris have been removed and the Property 
restored to its former condition, any funds remaining in the $30,000.00 hold-back should be 
turned over to the Bradleys. If the amount of the hold-back account is insufficient to cover all of 
the costs of the removal and restoration of the Property, the Markhams may submit a motion to 
the Court for further judgment against the Bradleys regarding any such additional costs. 
V. Regarding the credibility of the witnesses, the Court concludes that the 
testimonies of Mr. Markham, Norton, and Shumway are credible, and the affidavits of Mr. 
Markham and Norton admitted into evidence are reliable. 
W. The testimony of Mr. Bradley on the critical facts is not credible, but is unreliable. 
Mr. Bradley repeatedly testified under oath at his deposition, at a time only eight months after the 
events occurred, that he did not recall any of the specific facts and circumstances of his 
conversations with Mr. Markham or Norton, nor did he recall details of meetings. Then at trial, 
nearly sixteen months after the events occurred, Mr. Bradley testified that he remembered many 
details of these same conversations and meetings. I conclude that Mr. Bradley may have given 
false testimony at trial to fit a legal theory or that he withheld information and truthful responses 
during his deposition. In either event, I do not consider his most critical testimony, particularly 
about his own actions, to be credible. 
X. In addition, Mr. Bradley's demeanor at the trial did not convey credibility. 
Y. Mrs. Bradley's testimony lacks credibility as well. To the extent it has credibility, 
26 
she does not have any personal knowledge regarding the critical aspects of the Bradleys5 waiver, 
and her other testimony is not sufficiently credible to refute the testimony of Norton and Mr. 
Markham, the admitted documentary evidence regarding the Markhams' credit worthiness, or the 
evidence that it was unreasonable and in bad faith for her and Mr. Bradley to refuse to sell the 
Property. 
Z. Judgment should be entered in favor of the Markhams against the Bradleys 
consistent with these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as well as finding the Bradleys in 
contempt of court. The Markhams should be awarded their attorneys' fees and costs as 
established by affidavit. 
DATED this 1H day of March, 2006. 
G. RAND BEACHAM, District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this 2006,1 provided true and correct 
copies of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each of the 
attorneys/parties named below by placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at 
the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah: 
Russell S. Mitchell 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Aaron D. Randall 
Attorney for Defendants 
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